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I. INTRODUCTION     
 
  Economists long have recognized the advance of human know-how as the central 
driving force behind the remarkable increases in living standards that have been achieved over 
the past two centuries. Contemporary scholars tend to attribute this understanding to the work 
of Solow (1957) and other economists working with the new National Product account data 
in the years after World War II. However, these studies are best regarded as providing 
supporting quantitative evidence for something that sophisticated economists have known for a 
long time. Thus, writing during the first industrial revolution,  Adam Smith (1776) clearly 
understood and highlighted the key role of technological advance in lifting The Wealth of 
Nations; recall the pin-making example with which he begins his great book. 
  I am using the term “know-how” here to denote the wide range of techniques and 
understandings human societies have acquired over the years that enable them to meet their 
wants. In my use of the term, it encompasses “technology”, but includes more than that latter 
                                                                   
1The research behind this paper was supported by the Mellon Foundation An earlier version of this essay 
was     published in the OECD volume Knowledge Management and the Learning Economy  (see 
Nelson, 2000).    
  
term customarily is assumed to cover. One of the principal purposes of this essay is to analyze 
the nature of human know-how, and how it has been acquired.  
  While the remarkable advances in know-how are widely recognized, less attention has 
been paid to the fact that the advance of effective know-how has been extremely uneven 
across different economic sectors and classes of human needs. Some areas of human know-
how today are extraordinarily powerful; consider modern information and computation 
technologies, or certain fields of modern medicine. On the other hand, certain human illnesses 
have defied continuing efforts to deal with them better. Breast cancers remain a major 
scourge. And many broad areas of human activity have seen little progress in know-how. It is 
not clear that our ability to educate children has advanced much over the last century. Despite 
a lot of huffing at Business Schools and in books on management, there does not seem to have 
been much improvement over the years in management know-how. Why?  
  I offer here a very preliminary exploration of this important puzzle, which will be 
divided into three parts. First, as I suggested above, it seems important to try to get a grip on 
the nature of modern human know-how. What are its aspects, and how is it organized?  
Where is it "located" and how is it applied? I shall argue that human-know is multifaceted and 
variegated, and stored in different places and forms. Some of it is of the form often thought of 
as engineering product or process design, relatively well articulated  “how it is done” 
knowledge. However, much is embodied in particular human skills, as contrasted with “blue 
print like” know-how. Some involves sophisiticated understanding of why practice works; 
some simply understanding from experience that a practice does work.  And an important part  
of know-how is knowing how to tap into, and coordinate, the various capabilities and efforts 
that need to be brought together to do a job. 
  Second, there is the basic question of how humans achieved the tremendously broad 
and effective body of know-how that we have achieved.  I (in accord with many other 
scholars of technological advance) will propose that cumulative advance of know-how must 
be understood as a process of "cultural" learning or evolution. That cultural evolutionary 
process, in turn, involves the coevolution of technique and understanding. In recent times a 
good part of that understanding has been associated with a field of science or an engineering 
discipline. 
  Third, once one recognizes the extremely unbalanced nature of what we have 
achieved, it is apparent that our cultural learning or evolution system works much better in 
certain arenas than in others. In section IV I explore the factors that might explain this. Section 
V is concerned with education as a special case. In the concluding section I reflect on some of 
the consequences, if I am correct about the key reasons why certain areas of know-how are 
very difficult to advance.  
 
  II. THE NATURE OF HUMAN KNOW-HOW 
  Many of the important characteristics of human know-how, characteristics that are 
important to have in mind in reflecting on how know-how advances, and what makes the 
advance of know-how difficult in certain areas, can be brought into view by considering a 
particular example of modern advanced know-how: the performance of a surgery on a human  
heart.2 In the first place, it is important to recognize the variety of particular skills 
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involved, and that effective performance is a group achievement.  
  Thus the surgeon, who generally is thought of as the key actor, has command over a 
certain body of practice.  So does the anesthesiologist. To a considerable extent these bodies 
of practice are different.  On the other hand, each actor knows "about" the skills of the other.  
Also, in the performance of an operation there will be a number of assistants involved who 
have command over certain skills.  Some, but not all, of what they do could be done by the 
surgeon or the anesthesiologist, but it is far less costly to delegate relatively simple tasks to less 
highly trained and paid people.  In general the surgeon serves as orchestra conductor, as well 
as key player in the operation.  However, all the players know at least the broad outlines of 
the overall operation, and the details of their own roles in it.  In general a successful operation 
requires that all of the roles be performed effectively, and in effective tune with each other. 
  In the case of heart surgery, like in most modern technologies, much of the technique 
is embodied in specialized apparatus, substances, and other artifacts. The anesthesiologist 
works with various substances that have been found to be effective, with pieces of apparatus 
that deliver those substances, and with a variety of dials and other measuring instruments that 
enable him or her to monitor what is going on.  And the surgeon, of course, also works with a 
complex of materials and instruments. The embodiment of key aspects of the techniques 
involved in specialized artifacts should be understood as an extension of the team nature of 
know-how. Clearly much of that know-how is “upstream” from the locus of immediate action.  
  Another central characteristic of effective know-how is that it involves both a body of 
practice or technique, and a body of understanding. Behind the surgeon's command of skilled 
practice, and the anesthesiologist's, lies a broader body of understanding involving the human                      
   
body, of what is involved in the procedures being employed and the conditions of success and 
failure, and of the various substances and instruments being used. When things are going 
routinely, that broader body of understanding never may be invoked consciously. But it may 
play a very important role in holding skilled performance in place, being invoked unconsciously 
to prevent deviations that could undermine effectiveness or court trouble. And from time to 
time, in particular when something is seen or occurs that is not quite what is expected, 
conscious thinking tapping that body of understanding may be essential to effective 
performance. 
  Ever since Polanyi (1958) pointed it out, scholars have recognized that some of human 
know-how is "articulated," in the sense that it can be described and communicated in some 
form of language, or other symbolic system, while other aspects are "tacit". Thus a good 
portion of the specialized know-how of the surgeon and the anesthesiologist can control the 
work of their fingers, but may not be easily explainable in words or other symbols to others, 
even to other physicians, who however perhaps can learn by watching and trying to imitate. 
But other parts of their relevant know-how can be expressed in a way that can be understood, 
at least by other professionals with the same background of tacit knowledge.  
  These articulated parts of know-how often are written up in texts and treatises. 
Studying these may be an essential, if not sufficient, part of the way that pre-meds become 
doctors. And experienced doctors will go to the journals, or the Internet, to find out what is 
new, and sometimes to refresh their own knowledge. Like extant equipment and materials, 
texts and libraries provide storage for know-how outside of individual human minds.                       
   
  While it seems natural to associate "tacit" with the practice or technique aspect of 
know-how, and articulated with the understanding aspect, I do not think the mapping is all that 
neat.  Although it is clear that much of "technique" is tacit, a cake recipe, or a blueprint, is all 
"technique", but  to a considerable extent is laid out and articulated on paper.  Also, a 
considerable amount of technique is embodied in the artifacts used, and  while the 
anesthesiologist may not be able to explain just how his apparatus works, he almost certainly 
can identify it  by name and explain its use in a way that would enable another doctor to obtain 
and use it. On the other hand, the surgeon may see and understand that something is not going 
quite right with the operation, and not be able to explain in words just what he or she sees, or 
why that seems to signal trouble. 
  But language, and the ability to lay out know-how in language, clearly is very 
important in making know-how broadly available--an element of culture, as it were. The 
know-how of the surgeon and the anesthesiologist is cultural in the sense that much of what 
they know also is known by other surgeons and physicians, who have gone through similar 
training programs, use the same equipment, read the same journals, attend the same 
conferences. There are various mechanisms that facilitate, or even force, sharing of information 
among anesthesiologists. I do not mean to play down here the tacit aspects of learned skills, 
which may lie behind very great differences in effective performance, or the efforts of some 
professionals to keep certain aspects of their technique and understanding privy. But a striking 
aspect of most broadly important bodies of  technique and understanding is that they are 
broadly shared.                      
   
  On the other hand, it is clear that the overall know-how needed to perform complex 
tasks often is very divided.  I have highlighted the separate bodies of practice and 
understanding possessed by the surgeon, and the anesthesiologist. In turn the anesthesiologist 
may know how to make his equipment work, but little about how to produce or design that 
equipment. People at the company that sold  the machine may know those things, but no one 
at that company may know all of it.  Reflect on whether anybody, or any small group, at 
Boeing Aircraft Company "knows how" to produce, or design, a modern aircraft, including the 
essential “details”. 
  Because overall know-how is divided and widely distributed among different 
individuals and groups, to be effective know-how needs to be brought together and 
coordinated.  For that reason, an extremely important part of know-how is knowledge of the 
elements that are needed, and of how to coordinate, and manage their combined operation. 
Much of the know-how possessed by the chief engineer at Boeing is of this sort.  
  In another paper, Sampat and I used the term "social" technologies to describe this 
latter kind of know-how, and differentiated social technologies from physical technologies, a 
term we used to  denote what engineers generally mean by technology (Nelson and Sampat, 
2001). Under the standard conception, physical technologies are recipe or blueprint-like, 
characterizing what is to be done, including designation of the particular operations (which may 
require highly developed skills) and (in some cases quite specialized) materials involved, but 
do not speak to how the work is to be divided and coordinated. In contrast, what I call social 
technologies are associated with effective structures of division of labor, and procedures for 
task coordination, and management.                      
   
  As with practice and understanding, and tacit and articulated know-how, the physical 
and social aspects of technologies often are intimately intertwined.  Consider the famous Ford 
mass-production line for Model T cars, or the Toyota method of "lean manufacture."  These 
involve both a set of sequenced physical actions taken by the parties to the process, and a 
division of labor and a coordinating mechanism so that the actions taken by the particular 
parties ultimately add up to a finished automobile.  Or reflect on the heart surgery example that 
I gave at the start of this section. Again, one sees a complex mix of physical technologies 
involved, employed by a team in which each member must do assigned tasks in harmony with 
what others are doing.  
  I propose that the human know-how involved in getting complex things done generally 
involves this mixture of understanding and practice, of articulated and tacit knowledge, of 
physical and social technologies, that I have described in the particular case of heart surgery. 
The analysis of how automobiles are produced by Womack et. al. (2000) involves a similar 
mix of ingredients. Hutchins (1996) describes what is involved in navigating a ship in much the 
same way that I have described heart surgery, and uses that example as a vehicle for 
illuminating collective “cognition”.  Bucciarelli  (1994) has arrived at a similar conception in his 
analysis of what it means to know "how your telephone works".  
  These kinds of know-how systems have been brought into place, and develop further, 
through the cumulative actions of many individuals and organizations who have particular 
objectives in mind. However, the overall system cannot be regarded meaningfully as having 
been planned. Rather, our know-how systems need to be understood as having evolved, in a 
sense I now will elaborate.                        
   
 
III.  THE COEVOLUTION OF TECHNIQUE AND UNDERSTANDING 
  Scholars of technological advance, from a wide variety of disciplines, have converged 
on the proposition that technological advance proceeds through an evolutionary process. (See 
for example Constant, 1980, Nelson and Winter, 1982, Basalla, 1988, Dosi, 1988, Vincenti, 
1990, Mokyr, 1990, Petroski, 1992, Saviotti,1991, Metcalfe, 1998, Ziman, 2000, Nelson 
and Nelson, 2002.)  The process is evolutionary in the sense that at any time there generally 
are a wide variety of efforts going on to advance of technology, which to some extent are in 
competition with each other, as well as with prevailing practice.  The winners and losers in this 
competition are determined through an ex-post selection process. 
  However, the proposition that technology evolves in the above sense in no way 
denies, or plays down, the often extremely powerful body of understanding and technique 
used to guide their efforts, at least in modern times, by those who seek to advance it. Thus 
Vincenti’s discussion (1990) of what is involved in inventing, and problem solving, in aircraft 
design stresses the scientific knowledge, and the professional experience and technique, that is 
employed. He provides an extensive catalog of the kinds of complex knowledge that modern 
aeronautical engineers possess, and discusses in detail how this body of knowledge guides 
their efforts at design. Included centrally in his story is the body of testing technique and 
apparatus that designers can use that provides them with information regarding how proposed 
configurations and problem solutions likely will work in practice, which can be employed 
without going to an actual full scale test.                        
   
  However Vincenti, along with other scholars who propose that technological advance 
is an evolutionary process, argues (and provides the documentation for the argument) that 
efforts at inventing and technological problem-solving almost always reach beyond the range 
of options that are perfectly understood, or which can be reliably tested, short of full scale 
operation in the actual practical environment, and in that sense are somewhat "blind." 
Therefore, to a considerable extent what works and what does not, and what works better 
than what, must be learned through actual experience and actual competition. 
  Most scholars of technological advance also are united by their insistence that the 
process needs to be understood as "cultural" in the sense, first, that much of the background 
knowledge needed for inventing is widely held, and second, that anyone attempting to advance 
a technology almost always is standing on "the shoulders of giants", or more accurately, on the 
top of a large body of already achieved technique and understanding that has been developed 
by a large number of predecessors.  
  David’s discussion (1991) of the large number of diverse technological advances, 
made by different individuals and organizations, that were required to take advantage of the 
potentialities opened up by the earlier invention of technologies for the generation and 
distribution of electric power, provides a vivid demonstration of the cumulative and collective 
nature of technological advance. Rosenberg’s historical analysis (1996) of the development of 
the multiple uses of the laser is another splendid example of the point. 
  Earlier I argued that technology should be recognized as involving both a body of 
technique or practice, and a body of understanding or knowledge.  In the process of 
technological advance, both evolve.  Or, I would propose more specifically that technique and                      
   
understanding coevolve. The development of a particular new product or process generally 
brings with it a wider body of new understanding that includes, but transcends, the particulars 
of the new technique.  A new understanding, earned through this route, or through efforts 
more directly aimed to advance understanding, in turn provides clues and opportunities for the 
further advance of technique. 
  Since the days of Francis Bacon, the drive to advance technological practice and the 
pursuit of understanding bearing on that technology have gone hand in hand. Over the last 
century the linkage has been institutionalized in the development of fields of applied science 
and engineering disciplines expressly dedicated to providing the understandings useful for 
advancing practice in  a field of technology or an industry. The latter activity is largely the 
domain of business firms, or other organizations or individuals, who will actually use or sell the 
products or processes. The advance of understanding, however, is largely the mission of 
universities and public laboratories (see Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994).  
  Indeed, at the present time, the lion's share of research going on in American 
universities is in fields with names like "material science," computer science, electrical 
engineering, pathology, etc.  In today's world science is useful to inventing not so much 
because of serendipity, but because many fields of modern science are designed to help clear 
the path for technological progress. In a recent survey (Klevorick et al, 1995), industrial R&D 
executives were asked to identify the fields of academic science that most contributed to the 
successes of R&D, and they strongly tended to list fields of the sort mentioned above, as 
contrasted with, say physics or mathematics.                       
   
  For me at least, a striking characteristic of fields where technological advance has 
been rapid is that they all seem to be closely connected to a powerful applied science or 
engineering discipline (see Rosenberg, 1974, Klevorick et al, 1995, Nelson and Wolff, 1997, 
Rosenberg, 2001). These bodies of scientific knowledge serve, first, to enlarge and extend the 
area beyond existing practice that an inventor or problem solver can see relatively clearly, and 
hence go into without being completely "blind". That is, strong science provides guidance 
regarding what particular paths are likely to lead to solutions or improvements, and which are 
likely to be dead ends. In technologies illuminated by strong science, an inventor often can see 
a good distance beyond current best practice.   
  Second, the sciences and the engineering disciplines provide powerful ways of 
experimenting and testing new departures, so that a person who commands these can see 
relatively quickly and cheaply if they work, or are promising, or problematic. Thus pilot plants 
play a key role in efforts to develop new chemical process technology. Wind tunnels used to 
play a similar role in aircraft design. Where scientific and engineering knowledge is strong, 
these days one can explore and test by building computer models. More generally, strong 
scientific knowledge not only enables inventors to see promising paths, but also to reliably 
assess the  promise of the path in a timely fashion, and without having to build and test a full 
scale version in the actual operating environment. 
  I note, I stress, that these advantages lent by a strong body of understanding do not 
diminish the importance of learning by doing and using in the advance of a technology. As 
Vincenti has argued, in the end whether a new design or process is satisfactory, or better than 
what it aims to replace, can only be determined in on-line experience. I shall argue in the next                      
   
section that the capabilities to recognize, generate, evaluate, and duplicate on-line variation is 
absolutely essential. If these capabilities are strong, cumulative technological advance can 
proceed even if the body of understanding, the underlying science, is weak.  
  However, for reasons I have put forth above, a strong science base greatly augments 
the power and efficiency of efforts to advance a technology. I also note, propose, that when 
there is a strong body of underlying scientific knowledge, a good share of the work of 
advancing a technology tends to go on “off-line”, in facilities like industrial R and D. 
laboratories. The power of the underlying sciences means that people who have mastered that 
body of specialized knowledge are needed to do effective R and D. In general the skills here 
are very different from those who work “on-line”. And the activities involved in doing R and D 
tend to be different from those involved in on-line experimentation. The work of advancing the 
technology thus tends to be specialized both in terms of what is done, and in terms of the 
personal involved. A considerable degree of such specialization is a hallmark of modern 
industries where technological advance is rapid.  
  However, as Vincenti has argued, there is no escaping the need for on-line evaluation, 
and tinkering. In general, in fields where technological advance is rapid there is an interactive 
mix between learning by doing and using, and off line R and D. I shall argue in the next section 
that ability to experiment, and learn from experiments, is key to both aspects of the process. 
 
IV.  WHY HAS ACHIEVEMENT BEEN SO UNBALANCED?: SOME 
SPECULATIONS                      
   
  I want to focus now on the puzzle of why the advance of human know-how has been 
so uneven, spectacular in areas like information and communications, and in dealing with certain 
kinds of human illness, but very limited in other areas, for example education, or rehabilitation 
of criminals.  
  One obvious reason why know-how has advanced so much more  rapidly in some 
fields than in others is that more resources have been applied to the effort. Business firms have 
seen certain kinds of advances as being profitable, but not others. Governments have been 
willing to put public funds into R and D on certain classes of problems, but there has been little 
effective political support for public R and D moneys in other areas. Thus if one considers 
human illness, a major reason why little progress has been made on certain tropical diseases is 
that drug companies do not see the market in poor tropical countries as promising much profit, 
and publicly funded efforts have been limited.  
  But while “demand side” limitations clearly have been important in some cases where 
the advance of know-how has been very small, as Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) have 
pointed out, many important human wants remain unmet, even though significant profit could be 
earned by a person or firm that figured out how to remove the roadblocks to meeting those 
wants more effectively. There clearly are major differences across sectors and areas of human 
activity in the ability of society to advance effective know-how. Within medicine, cures have 
been found for Hodgkin’s lymphoma and testicular cancers, but not for prostate and breast 
cancers. These differences are puzzling and disturbing, and will be my focus in the remainder of 
this essay.                      
   
  At one level, signaled above, my basic argument is that the key factor is the strength of 
the understanding bearing on practice in a field. In an earlier paper (Nelson and Wolff, 1997) 
evidence was provided that the rate of technological advance in an industry is strongly 
correlated with the strength and vigor of the sciences on which R and D in that industry draws. 
However, this explanation of course only pushes the question back a level. Why are the  
sciences that underlie certain technologies so much more powerful than others? 
  As I have hinted earlier, my tentative explanation of the puzzle at this deeper level 
involves  looking at the causal arrow between strength of understanding and ability to 
experiment fruitfully with a technology the other way around. I want to propose that the ability 
to conceive and carry out well defined experimental probes of possible ways to improve 
technological performance, and to get sharp and reliable feedback on the results, contributes 
importantly to the human ability to develop an applied science that effectively illuminates that 
technology.  
  Of course I recognize that some technologies in effect are born out of prior scientific 
discovery which was the result of research that was not particularly oriented towards making 
new technology possible. The rise of radio technology is a good example. But after a new  
technology emerges, it begins to pose particular scientific problems and puzzles. Rosenberg 
(1982) has argued that a significant portion of the puzzles that science addresses have been 
revealed or created by the operation of technologies. In turn, the further advance of a 
technology depends to a considerable extent on how effectively science is marshaled to 
illuminate the roadblocks to progress.                      
   
  I have been proposing that the successful development of an applied science or field of 
engineering research often is the key to rapid and continuing advance of know-how in a field of 
activity. Electrical and chemical engineering are fields of research as well as teaching that came 
into existence as the industries using the technologies on which they are focussed grew in 
importance. The i nvention and development of the transistor and integrated circuits provided 
strong intellectual stimulation (and a reason for financial support)for the new field of material 
science. 
  These new technology oriented scientific and engineering fields rapidly enriched and 
improved their theoretical bases. But from the beginnings they have been very experiment 
oriented. And much of the experimenting has involved aspects of the technologies that provide 
the reason for the field’s support. In turn, advances in the technologies have provided puzzles 
and challenges for the sciences. Rosenberg’s discussion (2001) of the nature of engineering 
research and knowledge and its relationship to the advance of practice is particularly apt. 
  When progress is rapid, there seems to be a strong symbiosis between the particular 
structure of the technologies and the focus of the sciences underlying them. On the one hand, 
the technology itself tends to move towards where the understanding is strong. On the other 
hand, with technology linked to science, the science is able to progress by manipulating aspects 
of the technology experimentally. 
  Do I overstate the role of experimentation in the development of science?  I do 
recognize that astronomy, now cosmology, is not strictly an experimental science. However, 
given its intellectual base in physics, it has been possible to both draw on and focus 
experimental physical research which probes at the fundamental theoretical conceptions of                      
   
astronomy and cosmology. And the ability to make precise empirical observations of the sort 
needed to rigorously test evolving cosmological theory has enabled that science to proceed 
almost as if it were experimental. In some cases non experimental data can provide the basis 
for a strong science. But most of the strong fields of empirical science that have been 
developed have involved experimentation in an essential way. And I believe that this is 
especially the case with sciences that illuminate technologies. Those sciences cannot progress 
effectively, at least not in a way that is useful to advancing the technology, unless the technology 
itself is suitable for experimentation. 
  Above I noted that, in fields where technological progress has been rapid, problem 
solving and inventing is done to a considerable degree off-line, in specialized facilities separated 
from where the technology actually is being employed. While many of the problems and 
opportunities are recognized on-line, much of the problem solving is done off-line. For this 
specialization and separation to work effectively, it must be possible to isolate the technology 
from much of its operating surroundings, and to work with it in a controlled environment. And 
performance in that controlled environment must provide reliable information about likely 
performance “on-line”. For this to be so, it almost always is necessary that the “design” that has 
been developed and tested in a controlled environment off-line be robust to or protectable 
from different factors that can vary in actual practice, and which cannot be controlled. 
  This latter requirement also is important if the variations being explored are to be 
replicable. Replicability of course is essential if what is learned or created off-line in R and D is 
to be usable in practice, or at least transferable to an on-line setting so that its efficacy can be 
evaluated. In many fields of technology one sees progress being achieved through an iterative                      
   
process, with the locus of analysis going back and forth between the lab and actual practice. 
But replicability also is needed so that over the long run many parties can be involved in efforts 
to advance the technology, building on each others’ work, a condition I argued earlier seems to 
be essential if progress is to be cumulative. 
  This latter argument would be valid even if experimentation were nearly completely 
blind, and off line R and D had little power. However, I have been arguing that not only are 
these characteristics conducive, probably necessary, if a technology is to be advanced 
cumulatively and rapidly through experimental trial and feedback. They may be necessary, and 
certainly are conducive, for a body of reliable scientific knowledge, in the sense of Ziman 
(1978) to grow up that supports efforts to advance know how in an area. For an applied 
science or engineering discipline to develop a powerful body of knowledge and technique that 
illuminates a body of practice and aids in its improvement, that body of practice must lend itself 
to rigorous study and experimentation, with a capability to evaluate reliably the results of 
variation. Vincenti’s study (1990) of aeronautical engineering knowledge and its development 
provides strong evidence for this argument. 
  Am I underplaying the role of the basic sciences, like physics, mathematics, various 
areas of biology, whose orientation is not defined in terms of a particular technology or solving 
a set of practical problems? I do not want to underplay their role. I would propose, however, 
that advances in basic science mostly have their impact on technological advance by informing 
and strengthening the applied sciences and engineering disciplines that do have a practical 
focus. Thus I am proposing that fields of technology that advance rapidly and cumulatively have 
under them strong applied sciences that in turn are able to draw from strong basic science.                       
   
  This is not an endorsement of the “linear model”. Rather it is a proposition about the 
structure of a knowledge systems that exist in areas where the advance of know-how is strong. 
I am calling attention to the critical role of what has been called the “bridge” sciences, and 
proposing that to be effective they need to be, at once, closely oriented to the technologies they 
are designed to illuminate, and close enough to the basic sciences so that they can draw power 
from them. A large gap, on either side, limits their effectiveness. 
  Consider some of the implications, if this argument is broadly correct. First, as 
advocates of support of science long have argued, it is a poor bet, and a likely waste of money, 
to pour resources into advancing practice in a field, if understanding there is weak. There is 
little then to guide efforts to develop technology that will perform significantly better than 
prevailing practice. And information as to whether or not the new departures are effective may 
be slow in coming and inconclusive. For this reason, a necessary first step to solving the 
practical problem or meeting the pressing need is to support the scientific research that enables 
the problem to be understood. This argument of course is an old one, and often made in a self 
serving way by scientists.  
  But second, my argument points to the major difficulties that may need to be 
overcome, and the long time period that may be required, for a strategy of trying to develop a 
useful underlying science to be successful. The scientific understanding, to be useful, must link 
up with the available technologies for operating in the area, or point relatively clearly to 
practical new ones. Understanding far removed from possible practice does not provide sharp 
guidance as to how practice can be improved. On the other hand, an attempt to build an 
applied science that is far removed from strong fields of basic science may yield knowledge of                      
   
limited power. One implication of this is that the achievement of a science that illuminates a 
technology may depend on transforming the technology so that it becomes more amenable to 
scientific inquiry. As I shall argue shortly, there may be strong constraints that make this 
difficult. 
V. THE CASE OF EDUCATION 
  Consider a highly relevant case that illustrates, I believe, several of the points I have 
just made: the efforts to develop more effective school educational practice. (See Murnane and 
Nelson, 1984, Hagarty, 2000). I think it apparent that neither of the two attributes that I 
argued earlier made R and D in a field powerful are strong in the case of education. It is very 
difficult in education to predict with any precision just how a proposed change in teaching 
method actually will work out in practice. General understanding of the education process and 
schooling may provide a broad prediction, but the devil is in the details. And it is difficult, 
perhaps impossible, to get reliable information on this from simple inexpensive pilot 
experiments.  
  These limitations are closely related, I would argue, to the following problem. The fact 
that a particular practice seems to work well in a particular context does not mean that it can 
easily be transferred to another context, or if this is tried.  that it will work well there. Partly the 
problem is that it is difficult to specify in any detail, or to know, the essential aspects that 
determine its performance; thus replication is chancy. Another problem is that what works well 
in one context may not work so well in another, and it is hard to control for the relevant 
variables. Still a third problem, related to the above but of central importance in its own right, is 
that evaluation is extremely difficult. It may take many years before the lasting effects of a new                      
   
mode of instruction can be learned. And there may be many different kinds of impact to be 
considered. 
  The difficulties here clearly reside in the education process itself. Education as currently 
practiced largely involves a set of strategies and practices that are generally understood as 
appropriate in particular contexts, but with a lot of variation across individual classrooms and 
teachers. There are indeed canons of good practice. But not many educationists are ready to 
propose that there are a set of foolproof “cake recipes” that define best practice in teaching. 
And while novice teachers may learn a lot from observing able experienced teachers, every 
teacher has their own particular strengths and weaknesses, and style of operating. 
    A certain amount of classroom equipment is used: textbooks, perhaps film, recently at 
least computers. But, while some students of education hold out hope for the Internet and the 
computer, at present there are  no powerful devices used in education, comparable to the 
apparatus that dispenses and monitors anesthesia, that are used in heart surgery. Some years 
ago Cuban (1986) reviewed experience with using computers and other forms of teaching 
equipment in classrooms, and concluded that their impact had not been dramatic. In a recent 
paper, Murnane, Sharkey, and Levy (2001) review a particular educational program that 
centrally involves use of the Internet, and also a considerable amount of programmed 
instruction, and which has been implemented in a number of schools. They highlight the 
apparent broad effectiveness of the program, but also argue that the standardized instruction 
package and the use of the Internet should be understood as a complement not a substitute for 
an effective teacher working with students.                      
   
  It is well known that how an individual child learns in a classroom is strongly affected 
by the behavior and attitudes of other children in that classroom, and is not independent of 
what is going on in a child’s life outside of school. A major portion of the challenge for a 
teacher is to organize and manage classroom interaction, as well as to deal with the particular 
problems or challenges of individual students.   
  In section II I proposed that all bodies of human know-how bearing on complex 
activities, like a heart operation, or designing and building an aircraft, or education, involve a 
mix of articulated and tacit knowledge, and physical and social technologies. It is apparent that 
the mix in education is heavily weighted towards the tacit and social. 
  These c haracteristics are reflected in the limited ability to conduct educational 
experiments, the results of which provide reliable guides to how to improve educational 
practice in real world settings. For many years such experimentation has been high on the 
agenda of scientifically oriented Schools of Education. But consistently the record has been that 
what is reported to work in a lab school or in another chosen testing locus has been hard to 
duplicate outside of the locus of the original research. As noted, part of the problem clearly has 
been that it is impossible to describe what the experimental treatment was with sufficient 
precision and detail so that one could know whether one was replicating the key elements of it 
or not. Part is that the context conditions that enabled a particular treatment to work were not 
fully known, and not necessarily in existence in other places. And part surely is that evaluation 
takes time and in many cases does not yield unambiguous results. 
  These basic characteristics of education also limit what can be learned from large scale 
statistical studies that collect and analyze data from a number of different schools or classes or                      
   
modes of teaching. It is not that statistical studies do not identify important correlates of good 
educational performance. One important correlate is the education and income of a student's 
parents. Another is the training and experience of a student's teacher. But the former provides 
no information as to how to improve the performance of schools, given the backgrounds of the 
students. And while the latter does provide guidance to schools regarding the kind of teachers 
they ought to hire and about the importance of encouraging promising teachers to stay in the 
system, it tells very little directly about the educational practices that work best.  
  The fields of research that one would hope would illuminate the educational process 
and guide efforts at improvement in fact provide only a dim light. On the one hand, research 
that is focussed on subject matter that arguably is closely related to the education process at 
best seems to yield course grained and often unreliable conclusions. On the other hand, 
scientific research that limits itself to subject matter where relatively fine grained and reliable 
knowledge can be attained, tends to generate findings that are a far distance from anything  
useful in the education process. 
  Thus a recent (U.S.) National Research Council report, How People Learn: Bridging 
Research and Practice (1999), gives the following as an example of the former kind of research 
finding, and how such knowledge is useful in education:  
  “Students come to the classroom with preconceptions about how the world works. If 
their initial understanding is not engaged, they may fail to grasp the new concepts and 
information that are taught, or they may learn them for purposes of a test but revert to their 
preconceptions outside the classroom” (p.10)                      
   
  The contrast of this bit of knowledge, useful as it is, with say the discovery that scurvy 
among seamen was caused by the absence of a class of foodstuffs in their diet, is striking. The 
latter led relatively directly to dealing with the problem by assuring the availability of certain of 
those foodstuffs. The understanding highlighted in the NRC report points, but only very 
broadly, to good teaching practice.  
  I note that the original discovery about scurvy was not associated with a theory to 
explain it. Theoretical understanding was achieved only much later, with the discovery of 
vitamins and their association with body function. But the initial finding regarding the causes of 
scurvy was sharp and precise enough to identify a treatment that worked. The NRC 
publication, from which the above quote is drawn, seems blind to the difference between the 
nature of the findings of educational research, and the knowledge base under medical practice, 
or at least is mute about it. 
  The same NRC reports mentions that more fundamental research has been going on in 
brain science and cognitive science. Considerable progress  has been made towards 
understanding areas and mechanisms in the brain associated with various kinds of perception, 
and thinking. However, the detailed hard findings at this level are many layers away from 
providing useful input to guiding teaching. The NRC report acknowledges this, and points to 
the intellectual gap as a real problem: 
  “The concern of researchers for the validity and robustness of their work...often differ 
from the focus of educators on the applicability of these constructs in real classroom settings..” 
(P.6).                      
   
  But the report does not draw the obvious conclusion that the fine grained and reliable 
knowledge coming out of fields like brain science are that way because the subject of research 
is carefully controlled and far removed from the hurly burly of the educational process. Again, 
the contrast with medical care, where  biological understanding often is very close to what one 
needs to know to cope with a disease, is striking.  
  Since both education and medical care are activities focussed on helping individuals, 
and the recipient of the treatment is a vital element of the process of teaching or healing, I 
believe the contrast here is well worth exploring further. Most of the significant advances in 
medical care have occurred over the past one hundred and fifty years, and have been 
associated with a tremendous increase in scientific understanding of human illness of various 
kinds, and of the effects of various treatments. The basic mechanisms in question are biological, 
and often the biological mechanisms can be understood in terms of the chemistry and 
(occasionally) physics involved, all strong fields of science. Animals in many cases provide 
convenient models of humans, in circumstances where in vitro chemistry does not illuminate 
what is going on.  
  In general the improvements in performance of medical care have occurred in areas 
where understanding has become strong, but this is not always the case. In many cases we 
have learned that certain treatments work (like limes for scurvy, and aspirin for headaches) but 
initially at least have had little understanding of just why. But we were able to learn that lime 
juice prevents scurvy, and aspirin relieves headaches and seems to reduce the risk of certain 
heart ailments,  and make use of that knowledge in the practice of medicine, because limes and 
aspirin are well defined  substances. Thus “swallowing lime juice” or "taking aspirin" are                      
   
routines that can be well enough described so that people instructed to do it can, with only a 
small chance of getting it badly wrong. 
  As these examples indicate, the medical treatments that we have learned work well 
have tended to be well specified; indeed most of them are substances or other artifacts 
(glasses) that we have learned (often scientifically) to characterize precisely. And by and large 
their effects are not greatly influenced by factors from which they cannot be shielded (but 
consider the warnings on medicines regarding what not to take at the same time). Thus we are 
able to control and calibrate the treatment, and are able to learn from variation, either 
accidental or deliberate.  
  And of particular importance for the current discussion, these characteristics, where 
they exist, permit both controlled experimentation regarding new medical practice--new drug 
regimes, surgical procedures, etc--and the development of a relatively strong body of 
biomedical scientific knowledge. While biomedical scientists have a tendency to underplay the 
importance of what is learned in “on line” actual practice, “off line” R and D, and controlled 
tests, play a very powerful role in facilitating the evolution of medical know-how. (For a careful 
balanced discussion rich with empirical examples, see Gelijns, 1991). 
  Some scholars deeply committed to research to advance educational practice have 
taken as an insult my argument that the findings of research in these fields simply do not have 
the power of the findings of biomedical research to illuminate and facilitate the improvement of 
practice. My argument has nothing to do with t he quality of the researchers in the field of 
education, but rather with the innate limitations on the ability of research to contribute to the 
advancement of technologies that are largely tacit and social.                       
   
  Earlier I put forth business management as another field where, like education, advance 
scarcely has been dramatic. I propose that the reasons are very similar. 
  There probably has been less “off-line” research aimed to develop better management 
practice than there has been off-line experimental research in the field of education. Most of the 
research in this area has proceeded by trying to identify firms or cases where a particular 
practice is or has been employed, and to compare performance in these instances with cases 
where the practice has not been employed. But as with the case of cross sectional studies of 
the efficacy of education practice, such efforts have been bedeviled by, on the one hand, great 
difficulty in pinning down the essentials of the practice being studied and hence being able to 
determine when it was actually employed, and second, being able to distinguish the effects on 
firm performance of use of the practice from the effects of other variables. These two basic 
problems are, of course, not unrelated. The various studies of the value of employing “quality 
circles” is a good illustration of these problems. (See Cole and Scott, 2000, and Nelson, 
Peterhansl, and Sampat, forthcoming.) 
  My mother discipline is economics. The science of economics has much the same 
weaknesses as the science of education, and of business management practice. and I would 
argue for the same basic reasons. The limitations of all three fields  largely reflect, under my 
argument, that the basic human activities in these arenas are highly tacit and social, and difficult 
to specify with precision. In each of these fields the motivation for study is largely to enable 
policy to be more effective, and in these fields there is strong awareness that the prevailing  
science provides at best only general and hedged guidance to policy. In economics, as in 
education, there is strong faith that “if we only had better scientific understanding” we could                      
   
develop more effective and reliable policies. But if I am right, the fact that economics as a 
science provides only broad and uncertain guidance to policy  is in good part the result of the 
fact that the objects of interest are impossible to define and measure with precision. The 
science of economics can be made precise only by shifting the study to an arena far simpler 
than that in which we really are interested. And this, many would argue, is exactly what has 
happened in much of economics. While the results may make for some nice economic 
theoretical arguments, they do little to illuminate real policy issues. 
  But to return to the medicine-education comparison, it is interesting to note that, where 
medical treatment can not be specified in terms of pills or other physical substances, or a clear 
cut procedure like splinting a bone break, or where the effects of treatment cannot be isolated 
from those of other variables and actions (as in treatment of obesity), or where understanding is 
weak and animal tests do not provide much information (as in study of the effects of 
environmental factors on the incidence of cancer) medical R and D does not demonstrate much 
power. Here the situation is not very different, it seems to me, than in education and business 
management. 
 
V. SOCIAL TECHNOLOGIES AND THE EVOLUTION ON KNOW-HOW 
  Are technologies that are strongly social and tacit important exceptions that fall outside 
of the remarkable abilities human societies have developed to advance their practical know-
how? The discussion above has been concerned only with education in any detail; the 
discussion of management and economics was at best cryptic. But the elements that seem to 
make progress difficult in these areas  seem quite similar, and to hold as well for areas like the                      
   
prevention of crime, or teen age pregnancies, or managing the medical care system, or the 
Internet. Interestingly, the two  last examples are of cases where the underlying physical 
technologies have become very powerful, but the social technologies needed to manage them 
are not very effective.  
  In a recent book, Kline (1995) argued that human behavior in a social context was 
intrinsically more complex than the operation of a physical machine or other artifact, according 
to the particular measure of complexity that he lays out. He proposed, persuasively in my view, 
that fields of science that deal with very complex subjects cannot be expected to come up with 
the precise laws and relationships that have come out of physics.  Is the reason why the 
sciences underlying social technologies are relatively weak  simply that these kinds of 
technologies are very  complex? 
  This is one way of looking at it. However, I have put forth a particular set of arguments 
regarding just why these kinds of technologies are difficult to advance, that involves their tacit 
and social nature in an essential way. I want to stand by my argument that the heart of the 
problem is the difficulty in these technologies of doing precise and replicable experimentation, 
and gaining reliable and generalizable knowledge from variation. 
  This formulation among other things has the advantage of leading to the question of 
whether these characteristics are innate, or whether they can be modified. I am not alone in 
pointing to these characteristics as an important part of the problem in advancing education.  
   Indeed there has been a long standing argument between educators  who have 
advocated bringing more tightly controlled and explicit routine to the education process, and 
those who have resisted this strongly saying that this hinders tailoring education to the particular                      
   
needs and capabilities of individual students and the characteristics of particular groups of 
students assembled in a class (see e.g. Murnane and Nelson, 1984). This debate has ranged 
from argument about whether or not there is one particular way that reading is best taught, to 
the appropriate use of computers in education. A common strand, however, is the pluses and 
minuses of developing and using standardized methods. 
  Recently several economists (see e.g. Arora and Gambardella, 1994, Dasgupta and 
David, 1994, Cowan and Foray, 1997) have argued that the extent to which a technique is 
tacit or articulated and codified depends to a good extent on the magnitude and skill of the 
efforts to codify it. While it is not plausible that even a major effort could fully codify the skills 
of an expert surgeon, or an effective teacher, surely there is something of a common core of 
good practice that, to some extent can be codified. There certainly are relatively programmed 
teaching methods, including those built into computers, that have had a certain amount of 
effectiveness. The question is how far this can be pushed without running into the problem 
raised by those skeptical of routinization. One size of shoe does not fit all feet. But are there a 
reasonable number of well defined shoe sizes that mostly will do the job? That turns out to be 
the case, mostly, with shoes. How about education? 
  Much of the tacitness of educational practice is bound up, I would argue, with the 
innately social aspects of teaching and learning. There needs to be effective interaction between 
teacher and student, and to a considerable extent that interaction is influenced by the larger 
group in a classroom. The problem with advancing social technologies is that there are strong 
constraints associated with the capabilities and wills and beliefs of the people who’s actions 
somehow must be enlisted, coordinated, or managed. In turn, these individual and idiosyncratic                      
   
constraints make it difficult or impossible to standardize a technique, or even to describe what 
is being done with precision, and make reliable experimentation, or generalizable feedback 
from operating experience, very difficult as well. Perhaps the course to greater effectiveness is 
to get rid of these constraints, by substituting physical for social technologies. 
  Indeed in many arenas exactly this has been done. Taylorism routinized and made 
explicit the jobs that workers did in manufacturing technology, and machinery and later more 
general automation transformed much of what had been a social technology of management 
and control into physical technology. Once this was done, it was possible to experiment with 
new designs for machines and automated coordination mechanisms, and make real progress on 
the management and coordination problem. In turn, routinization and mechanization greatly 
facilitated the development of strong engineering knowledge.  
  To some extent computer programmed instruction does this in education. But it is 
highly uncertain how far mechanized instruction can be pushed. And there remains the nagging 
problem that in this society at least individual differences are valued, not seen as something to 
be strongly repressed. 
  Improving the way we educate children surely is an extraordinarily important goal. 
Research that will help to guide experimentation and evaluation is of top priority. But perhaps 
we need to recognize that advancing knowledge and practice here is innately more difficult than 
advancing know-how in many areas of medicine, or agriculture, or telecommunications. And it 
is not at all clear that the strategies and organizational structures that have worked well to 
advance know-how in areas where it has been possible to routinize practice, to make                      
   
knowledge of best practice well articulated to a considerable degree, and to control or 
mechanize the processes closely, are the ones that will work well in education. 
  To some extent the constraints here are of our own making, and we can relax them if 
we choose. We now use drugs to help control certain individual behaviors that are judged 
likely to be destructive to self and others, but thus far society has shown reluctance to heavily 
drug all individuals who are judged likely to commit crimes. Can we require that children 
deemed likely to be disruptive in class go on drugs? Are we willing to jail parents whose 
children skip school? We can if we wish control at least some of the variables that make it so 
difficult to routinize and standardize education. And that probably would make it easier to learn 
from educational experimentation. However, most of us don’t want to go very far down this 
road. 
  In education, and in other areas, there clearly are limits on our willingness to routinize 
and mechanize for the sake of better control, and the ability to make faster progress. A Brave 
New World is not all that attractive.  
  My exploration of the factors behind the uneven evolution of human know-how is just 
starting. I bet that my conjecture about the central importance of ability to recognize, generate, 
evaluate, and duplicate on-line variation will hold up after wider and deeper study. I bet that my 
proposition about the importance of a strong underlying applied science or engineering 
discipline, for which the former condition is necessary (but not sufficient) will hold up. 
According to this theory, areas where a major portion of the know-how is social and tacit, and 
there are constraints on changing this, are innately difficult to advance.                       
   
  But they are only a portion of such areas. Lerner’s recent study (2001)of frustration in 
the attempts over many years to deal effectively with breast cancers shows continuing dispute 
about the efficacy of physical technologies, associated with inability to get sharp persuasive 
evidence regarding the efficacy of different treatments. I view the case here as strongly 
supporting my proposition that a necessary condition for making progress is the ability to learn 
by doing and get reliable feedback from on-line variation. I see the inability of the “science” to 
advance here sufficiently to enable the development of significantly better practice as being as 
much the result of inability of trial and error learning to generate knowledge of what works, as a 
reason for the continuing blindness. That a technology is largely tacit and social seems to doom 
it to slow progress, but these conditions certainly don’t seem to be necessary for such 
frustration.  I hope the reader will agree with me that there are a range of fascinating and 
important puzzles here. Come join in the exploration. 
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